DICTATORSHIP AGAINST DEMOCRACY

The story of democracy, in the title of John Keane’s grand history, is one of life and death. It is not a glorious story. Death has been more prevalent than life.

The Greeks invented, says S.E. Finer, two of the most potent political features of our present age: they invented the very idea of citizen, as opposed to subject, and they invented democracy. But it did not last. Democracy emerged, haltingly, in the fifth century BC and collapsed with the end of Athenian independence less than 300 years later, having suffered several fits of near death in the process.

After that, the world forgot about democracy for 2000 years, until it was reinvented in the American Constitution of 1787. Whereas Athenian democracy had been direct – decision-making collectively by assembly to which all citizens had access – the Americans invented representative democracy. Now, citizens would elect representatives to the national and local congresses that would take charge of decision-making on their behalf.

Although the Athenians invented the idea of the citizen, the inclusive concept of citizenship and of universal suffrage took hold only in the twentieth century. In the latter part of that century, this form of government expanded from a minority to a majority of countries and territories. At the entry into our century, 140 of about 190 countries in the world had functioning multiparty elections. If, finally, there has been glory in the story of democracy, that has come only recently. And even so, the lesson to be drawn from history is that democracy is not a natural form of rule. It must be wanted, it must be created, recreated and nurtured, and it is inevitably exposed and in danger.

This mini-history introduces a review, in the Taiwan Journal of Democracy, of various recent works of the contemporary authoritarian challenge to democracy from Russia and China, and the democratic response, such as it is.

Read the review here.

DANGERS TO DEMOCRACY – ATHENIAN LESSONS

In the Agora Museum in Athens is a stone Stele of Democracy.  A relief shows the people of Athens under the protection of Democracy. A text is inscribed of a law forbidding the reintroduction of tyranny, both the act of rising up against the Demos and collaboration with would-be tyrants.

This law was passed in 337 B.C. as the short-lived democracy was coming to a final end after Athens had been defeated by Philip of Macedon. It stands as testimony to the Athenians’ understanding of both the value and difficulty of democracy. Without democracy there will be tyranny. The upholding of that protection is fraught with peril. Their forbidding of tyranny in law was a desperate attempt to salvage what could not be saved.

Democracy in Athens lasted only about 250 years. It was always imperfect and gave way several times in the process to autocracy in one form or another. It came about after a period of aristocratic excess, both in the exploitation of the populous and in feuding between aristocratic clans. What followed should perhaps be described as controlled aristocracy rather than democracy in a modern understanding. Nevertheless, for a while the Athenians (those who counted, obviously) mostly held tyranny at arm’s length.

The danger to that protection comes both from without and from within. By 337, the Athenians were no longer masters in their own house and in control of how they would be ruled. But their desperate law also show their awareness that internal forces may rise against popular rule if they can, and if so are likely to find followers in the population.

They had ample experience of internal danger. At least twice, defeats in foreign wars led to oligarchic revolutions. Another danger was the seduction of mobs by demagogues, i.e. a danger to democracy from within democracy itself. The philosopher Socrates was sentenced to death when some of those he had annoyed were able to persuade a jury of 500 citizens that he deserved to die for being a nuisance. That influenced his pupil Plato to make himself the founding philosopher of autocracy. In Euripides’ tragedy Orestes – about how a mob was whipped up to condemn a deluded man who had been seduced by the gods to kill his mother to death by stoning – Orestes says: “The people are to be feared when led by unscrupulous men.”

The Athenian Stele of Democracy identifies the danger to the people to be tyranny as the likely state of affairs in the failure of democracy. Dangers to democracy come from both internal and external sources. The internal dangers are usurpation of power by anti-democratic élites, collusion by opportunistic follower, and seduction of the populous by unscrupulous leaders.

So what else is new?

TOURISM IN TOTALITARIANISM

What do visitors from democratic countries see and learn when they visit countries that are governed dictatorially? All through the 1930s, up until the outbreak of the Second World War, visitors from elsewhere in Europe, America and beyond traveled to a Germany under Nazi totalitarianism. In a gripping book, Travellers in the Third Reich, Julia Boyd takes us to Hitler’s Germany through the eyes of some of the foreign visitors.

Many were tourists and were by and large impressed and pleased with what they saw. They took in the sights: the beauty of the countryside and the quaint old towns. They met friendliness and generosity. Many of these visitors were not political but were favourably disposed to Germany and were struck by the country’s progress. They saw the Autobahns, the gleaming new airports and rail stations, the modern architecture. People were at work and seemed happy with their conditions.

The visitors were not ignorant of the repression, the propaganda, the censorship, the person cult, the persecution of the Jews. But what is striking in what they told from their visits is that mostly the knowledge of repression in the end did not matter much for the way they saw the regime. It delivered and what it delivered was impressive.

Other visitors were political: officials, parliamentarians, journalists, academics, some pro-Nazi and some anti-Nazi. What is striking in this group is that almost no one changed their opinion about Hitler and his regime as a result of what they experienced. Those who were pro-Nazi, saw what they expected to see and stayed pro-Nazi. Those who were anti-Nazi, likewise saw what they expected and had their opinion confirmed.

Today, tourism in totalitarianism is in China. Visitors come back home starry-eyed of the regime’s achievements and the country’s development. They have met friendliness and generosity. They have seen the high-speed rail, the airports, the city skyscrapers. They have met people whose living standards are improving and who speak well of their political leaders.

These visitors know that they are in a China of repression, but there is generally a BUT, and what follows the BUT – the impressive display of delivery and development – often causes the knowledge of repression to fall by the wayside when they sum up what they have learned.

In the 1930s, the Hitler regime did deliver for many Germans, but at the cost of depriving all Germans of their liberty. In China today, the Xi Jinping regime does deliver for many Chinese, but again at the cost of liberty deprived. The fact of delivery for some, does not erase the fact of repression for all.

The lesson of Julia Boyd’s fine book is that tourists in totalitarianism should remain skeptical. Many who went to Germany were unable to and came to regret their naiveté. Occasional visitors to China, and regulars too, should caution themselves that in a totalitarian regime that is in control, what they see is not necessarily what there is. It is best to stay agnostic and to assume that from what you see and hear you have probably learned next to nothing about how things really are and what Chinese people really think.

COLD WAR ON TWO FRONTS

(Published in German as Kalter Krieg an Zwei Fronten in WELT_SICHTEN, Juli-August 2018)

In the early years of the 21st Century, the world looked stable. There was economic progress. Democracy was advancing. The global order was collaborative under American leadership and the custodianship of the Washington institutions.

Fast forward to 2018 and this outlook has changed dramatically. China has not become “like us.” Russia has reverted to totalitarianism. Instead of collaborative order, we have confrontational turmoil. Autocracy has made itself assertive and confident, and is increasingly rewarded with respect. Western Europe is in the grips of the politics of anger. Democracy has been pushed on to the defensive, and democratic countries are riven by self-doubt and internal divisions. America elects Trump. Britain goes for Brexit.

China

“Western leaders and analysts have often projected on to China an image of their preferred imaginings, seeing it through the rose-colored glasses of the West.” So writes (in the New York Times) Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, now the President of the Asia Society Policy Institute.

Much misunderstanding of the People’s Republic has grown out of a misunderstanding of Deng Xiaoping and his post-Maoist reforms. He was a pragmatist, but for the purpose of salvaging the regime. The state was bankrupt financially and bereft of authority. It has been thought that Deng recast the regime from being a political project, as it had been under Mao, into an economic project with the management of growth its purpose.

But he never did. His “reform and opening up” was to be exclusively economic. Politically his mission was restitution. The absolute determination then, as it is now, was and is the perpetuation of the Party regime. The PRC has been, is, and will be a political project.

In 2012, Xi Jinping came to power. Since most observers now though of the People’s Republic as an economic project, it was widely expected that Xi’s priority would be economic reform. Those expectations were, however, dashed as it turned out that Xi’s priorities were political.

During his first term, Xi has overseen a streamlining of bureaucratic command through a relentless concentration of power. He has put himself at the helm of civilian, security and military bureaucracies, eliminated the legacy of collective leadership, and elevated his own position in a person cult similar to that of Mao. Censorship, internet control, propaganda – all that is intensified, as is Party discipline, political education in schools and universities, “guidance” in literature and the arts, and more. The internal security budget is now larger and growing faster than the military budget. These “reforms” amount to a radical transformation of the regime, taking the PRC into its third stage, after those of Mao and Deng and his followers, and breaking free from Deng’s legacy of pragmatism and collective leadership.

Finally, Xi has brought ideology back in. Shortly after having become General Secretary of the Party, he took the new Politburo Standing Committee to the National Rejuvenation exhibition in Beijing’s National Museum and launched his “China Dream,” now omnipresent to give meaning to all aspects of state action, at home and abroad. In the reformed People’s Republic, Marxism has no traction. In its place, Xi has introduced a chauvinistic melody of nationalism. The “Dream” is of national greatness and prowess, down to the assertion that “each person’s future and destiny is closely linked to the future and destiny of the nation.” His closing address to the People’s Congress in Beijing on the 19th of March this year was his most undisguised celebration of national glory to date.

Russia

Russia’s behavior in the world is baffling. Neighboring countries invaded: Georgia and the Ukraine. Crimea annexed. A covert war waged in eastern Ukraine. In Syria, support for a deadly regime, its use of illegal weapons of mass destruction, including chemical poison and indiscriminate barrel bombing, condoned. Throughout Europe, financial and/or propagandistic support of right-radical parties and organizations. In Britain, propagandistic engagement on the side of Scottish independence and Brexit in that country’s two eventful referendums. In America and Europe, systematic disruption by social media and other manipulations of democratic elections.

How to account for a super-power wrecking havoc on established international laws and norms, nevermind common morality?

Putin’s Kremlin is now a very assertive regime. Gone is the confusion of his first presidential period (2000 – 2008) when, for a while, there was hope that he might be cleaning up the corruption he had inherited and dragging Russia towards a semblance of rule of law at home and collaborative engagement abroad.

What instead happened was, firstly, a kleptocratic consolidation. Some unfriendly oligarchs had their takings confiscated, some were imprisoned, many migrated abroad. Corruption was not eliminated but narrowed into a single oligarchical clan under Putin’s control.

Secondly, any hope of democratization was quashed. Russia is now an autocratic system that operates behind a thin disguise of democratic form. In the recent presidential election, there were seven candidates in addition to Putin, none of them independent, all anointed by Putin. The Kremlin is exposed to no outside controls, no effective legislature, not effective judiciary, no effective press.

Thirdly, the regime has given itself a certificate of ideological justification. Since the Kremlin’s policies are unpalatable, it is tempting to think we are dealing with a primitive regime that has no imagination beyond brute force. But that is to underestimate Putin and his circle. They are in fact pursuing a sophisticated agenda of ideas.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, what happened, as seen through Western eyes, was that Communist dictatorship collapsed. But not through Russian eyes. The Soviet Union had been monumentally successful in completing a Russian expansion that had been unfolding for centuries into an empire stretching from Central Asia to Central Europe. Overnight, that was all lost. What Putin called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” was not the loss of Communism but of empire.

In response, he has started the process of rebuilding the lost empire. That will obviously not be achieved in his lifetime, but he is restoring purpose to Russia and securing his position in history as the great leader who set the job in motion.

The Putin ideology starts from a vision that goes by the name of “Eurasia.” In that vision, “Russia” is a spiritual empire of historical-religious origin, an empire of virtue. The physical empire may have collapsed, but its spiritual legitimacy survives irrespective of the momentary coincidence of national borders. This, for example, is why the Ukraine cannot be independent and European, because that is not what it is, because it is inescapably a part of spiritual Russia. This empire is “Eurasian,” meaning of Eastern rather than Atlantic mooring.

The second component of the ideology is enmity: Russia has enemies who will her ill: Atlantic Europe, the European Union, America, liberalism, democracy. That world-view was confirmed, as seen from Moskva, by western policies in response to the fall of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev accepted imperial disintegration in Eastern Europe and German reunification in return for a promise from America and Germany that NATO would not expand eastwards. This promise was broken when the ex-Warsaw Pact nations and the Baltic republics were brought into NATO, or so it was seen in Moskva. The European embrace of the Ukraine was a continuation of that betrayal. Putin’s Russia is convinced that the Americans and Europeans will never afford her respect and never recognize her as an equal partner in collaboration.

From these ideas come the convictions that Russia has something to fight for, that the empire of virtue has the right to fight and to choose the means, and that since it has enemies it has no choice but to fight.

Why has Russia chosen to fight its war with consistently dirty means? The Russian state has behind it an unsophisticated economy and a population with a poor standard of education and health. Putin’s dilemma: big in ambition but small in power. As a result, writes the historian Timothy Snyder in his just published The Road to Unfreedom, “the essence of Russia’s foreign policy is strategic relativism: Russia cannot be stronger, so it must make others weaker.”

The politics of influence

Russia and China have in common that they are ideologically committed and determined authoritarian regimes. Both entertain strategies of foreign policy that go beyond the normal pursuit of national interest to reach deep into the influencing of the cultures and policies of adversaries. While Moscow in this respect is a spoiler, Beijing’s aim is to build and protect respect for its model of governance.

The full ambition of Beijing’s strategy of influence has been elucidated by the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin in a report entitled Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe. This is the first in-depth study available on the detailed nature of Beijing’s influence policy, in this case in faraway Europe.

“China’s rapidly increasing political influencing efforts in Europe and the self-confident promotion of its authoritarian ideals pose a significant challenge to liberal democracy as well as Europe’s values and interests. While Beijing’s efforts have received much less scrutiny than the efforts of Putin’s Russia, Europe neglects China’s increasing influence at its own peril. Drawing on its economic strength and a Chinese Communist Party apparatus that is geared towards strategically building stocks of influence across the globe, Beijing’s political influencing efforts in Europe are bound to be much more consequential in the medium- to long-term future than those of the Kremlin. China commands a comprehensive and flexible influencing toolset, ranging from the overt to the covert, primarily deployed across three arenas: political and economic elites, media and public opinion, and civil society and academia. European states increasingly tend to adjust their policies in fits of ‘preemptive obedience’ to curry favor with the Chinese side. Political elites within the European Union and in the European neighborhood have started to embrace Chinese rhetoric and interests, including where they contradict national and/or European interests. EU unity has suffered from Chinese divide and rule tactics, especially where the protection and projection of liberal values and human rights are concerned. Beijing also benefits from the ‘services’ of willing enablers among European political and professional classes who are happy to promote Chinese values and interests.”

The democratic response

The stability of the early years of the 21st century has been displaced by a new Cold War, now on two fronts. Russia is setting itself on a course of neo-imperialism. China is intent on regaining its position of “Middle Kingdom” dominance in the world. Both are pursuing their aims with the confident determination that is enabled by the backing of nationalistic ideologies.

There is such a thing as the free world where citizens enjoy liberty of expression and information, the protection of rule of law, and mutual trust. This world needs to stand up to the authoritarian advance. The democracies need to come together and find their voice up against assertive autocracy. But that coming together is not happening. America is withdrawing from international solidarity and leadership. The European Union is unable, unity being undermined by economic sluggishness, populism and Brexit. The confidence and determination that is conspicuous on the authoritarian side is equally conspicuous in its absence on the democratic side.

It is easy to say that we in the free world should stand firm in defence of our values and to suggest ways in which this should be done. But if the European Union and America are unwilling or unable, where is inspiration and leadership to come from? Who in the world will now defend liberty? It would seem that before we can rise to the challenge from the authoritarian super-powers, we on our side need, first, to recognize the fact of that challenge and then, second, to look to ourselves and get our own democratic house in order.

FASCISM TODAY? IN CHINA?

Fascism was not defeated with the collapse of Mussolini’s regime in Italy and the crushing of Nazi Germany, but is alive and well in our own time and rearing its head in surprising places. So argues a new book entitled “Fascism – A Warning.” The author is Madeleine Albright, academic, diplomat, Secretary of State in President Clinton’s administration. That is to make you sit up and take note: a woman at the pinnacle of America’s élite establishment thinks it is time to warn against a return of Fascism, even in her own country.

She knows what she is talking about and draws on her own experience in top level politics, and also on her family’s experience of having twice become refugees. In 1939, they fled their home country of Czechoslovakia when it was invaded by Hitler’s Germany, and, having returned after the war, again in 1948 when the restored democracy was defeated by a Stalinist dictatorship.

The scholars have been unable to settle on any single authoritative definition of Fascism. Indeed, there is no straight and single doctrine, says Albright. Instead of working from a definition, she identifies Fascism a set of ideas and practices. The main ideas are nationalism, prejudice, enmity, anger, aggression, fear of the other and cult of violence and war. The practices in which Fascism is visible are aggression and thuggery-bullying in language and behaviour.

Her book, written with Bill Woodward, is a brief history of world politics from Mussolini’s coup in Italy in 1922 up to the present, all the while looking for the emergence of Fascist ideas and practices. She sees much of it in recent times and today: in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, there following through to warfare and genocide, in Peron’s Argentina and Chávez’s Venezuela, in Erdoǧan’s Turkey, in Putin’s Russia, in Orbán’s Hungary and in other countries in Central Europe who are following Orbán’s lead towards “illiberal democracy,” in the Kims’ North Korea, in Duterte’s Philippines, and elsewhere. She also sees it at home in America. There were significant Mussolini and Hitler inspired Fascist movements in America before the Second World War. McCarthyism in the 1950s was an outgrowth: “his temperament was that of a Fascist bully.”

And she paints President Trump in Fascistoid colours. Through her survey, she pays close attention to ideas, inclinations and language. She identifies what has been characteristic of acknowledged Fascist leaders. Placing Trump against that matrix, he is shown to be a leader who in speech and demeanour leans to the Fascist.

Could American democracy succumb? The historical experience is clear: when a leader of autocratic inclination comes to power by democratic means, the democracy is in danger. Madelaine Albright joins other political scientists who, while not predicting the end of democracy in America, warn that it could happen. Democracy is under pressure. It is not impossible that it could break.

To that she adds a second warning. When an American president displays autocratic tendencies, he gives crypto-Fascists elsewhere licence and encouragement. There is a decline in democratic health worldwide that is being cheered on from where free world leadership should have been forthcoming.

This analysis of Fascism’s lingering influence, even in the democratic heartland, is forcefully presented and persuasively argued. But it is not entirely complete. It is evasive on the meaning of Fascism. There is more to it than some scattered ideas and bullying behaviour.

Fascism is an ideology, which is to say an edifice of mutually coherent ideas that add up to a belief system of commanding force. The core idea is nation – Hitler called it das Volk. This is where destiny and purpose reside. It is the destiny of the nation to advance and the purpose of government to nurture that destiny. A second idea is unity. All institutions – government, courts, police, military, associations, businesses – are components of the nation. They have no autonomy outside of being building blocks of the national body. In Hitler’s language: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fürer. And a third idea is the subservience of the person to the nation and its custodians. Persons are wiped out as individuals and have no independent rights or interests that strand in the way of the good of the nation and the actions of its custodians. The dictatorship that comes from national unity is for the good of the people. Ultimately, if war and conquest is in the national interest, it is for the good of the people. Nation and people are one, personal happiness comes from progress towards the nation’s destiny.

If we thus were more demanding with the term Fascism, two consequences might follow. We might slightly back off from “Trump the Fascist.” Slightly. He satisfies the criteria of bullying language and behaviour, but he hardly possesses a coherent ideology to give legitimacy to a non-democratic America. Fortunately not, at least not yet.

We might also visit a setting of neo-Fascism that Albright evades, the China of Xi Jinping. This regime does not present itself to the world as a bully, in the way for example Putin’s Russia does. It is a bullying state. Ask democracy activists, who routinely get beaten up. Ask human rights lawyers, who are now pretty much forbidden from practicing. Ask the people of Xinjiang, now a horrific police state, complete with a vast network of concentration camps. Ask international corporations that are forced to humiliate themselves and pay tribute if they want to do business, or governments in smaller countries if they want collaboration. Or ask neighbouring countries around the South China Sea. But it is also a state with the clout and skill to disguise its bullying side and make itself look sophisticatedly elegant.

What should, however, get alarm bells ringing on the Xi regime is ideology. It has been thought that Deng Xiaoping, the master of “reform and opening up,” freed The People’s Republic from the burden of ideology. But Xi has orchestrated an ideological restoration. Not Marxist ideology (although he has recently started flirting with that again, too), but the hallmark of Fascism: nationalism and unity.

Early on after having come to power, Xi launched his “China Dream” of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That satisfies the Fascist bill of nation being purpose; it is the nation that is dreaming and being dreamt about. And he went further and added that “each person’s future and destiny is closely linked to the future and destiny of the country and nation.” That satisfies the Fascist bill if unity and of subservience of person to nation. This “dream” is now the official and omnipresent Chinese ideology.

I follow Madeleine Albright in being deeply concerned over the flirtation with Fascist ways in democratic countries. I agree that her warning is timely. But what even more gets the chill down my spine is a powerful, dictatorial and assertive state that gives itself the ideological certificate that nation is everything and person nothing, and that uses this certificate to tighten repression at home and pursue domination abroad.

THE DANGER OF LANGUAGE

The Windrush scandal in Britain is a story of how the members of a group of the population during the last few years found themselves demoted to a state in which they could not sleep at ease at night out of fear that someone would come and take them away. The Windrush generation are the migrants from the British West Indies who brought their labour force to Britain after the Second World War, on British encouragement, both adults and children with their parents. (The Empire Windrush was a transport ship that brought the first contingent of organised migrants from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands in 1948.) They settled here, made their lives here and became British.

Recently, members of this group came under intense scrutiny from immigration authorities and many found their right to live in Britain questioned. They were harassed for documentation to prove their right to reside. They found documentation such as employment and tax and social security records, even passports, disbelieved. They were forced into bureaucratic nightmares to procure additional documentation, often at substantial financial cost. They were denied standard services, such as health care, or were forced to pay for normally free services. Some were detained, some lost jobs, some were deported or threatened with deportation, some denied travel on the threat of not being readmitted, some refused re-entry from abroad.

The refugee children scandal in the United States is a story children of migrants on America’s borders, whose right of entry were in question, having been forcefully separated from their parents. They have sometimes been detained in concentration camp like facilities in border areas, sometimes sent away to other parts of the country.

In retrospect, authorities in both countries have acknowledged that what happened was wrong, but what should not have been done was still done. In both these civilised democratic countries practices came into operation which we otherwise associate with totalitarian dictatorships. How could that have happened?

It happened, of course, because officials on the ground obeyed orders from above. It has sometimes been seen as a mystery that totalitarian dictators have been able to get officials to implement brutish oppression, but there is no mystery. When officials are embedded in bureaucratic structures of command and obedience, those in command can get almost any order obeyed. Officials may not like what they have to do, but it gets done.

But in these two stories, there has been something more to it than obedience. Officials have executed perceived orders with extraordinary and brutal zeal, even in the face of horrendous and irrational consequences. Hardly anyone in position of authority in the respective services seems to have raised any question or objection, at least on principle.

That kind zeal comes from something else than just orders, it comes from the language in which the orders are couched. Language of caution can influence officials to implement orders with common sense and flexibility. Language of aggression can bend them to bureaucratic insensitivity.

In both these stories, public policy went seriously off the rails. The reason for that is ultimately that leaders were aggressive with the language they used to promote and justify their policies. In Britain, then Home Secretary Theresa May announced that immigration policy should be designed to create a “hostile environment” for illegal immigrants, and made a great show of that hostility. Immigration officials took to looking for illegal immigrants behind every bush and turned on a minority of mostly poor and black citizens with rigid demands of proof of their legality. In America, President Trump has whipped up anti-immigration sentiments by speaking of immigrants as criminals, rapists, and as vermin infesting the country, and asked for zero tolerance in the implementation of policy. Immigration officials dispensed retribution against children, even down to taking infants and disabled children away from their mothers.

Public policy depends on leadership for good or bad direction. Language is powerful. It is a responsibility of leadership to use language with prudence. Aggressive language from up high is dangerous – not just careless but dangerous. We see that in these two stories. We have had leadership of terrible language. We have had administrative practices that belong in totalitarian dictatorships.

 

WHERE ARE THE LIBERALS?

If we are liberals, we presumably believe in and defend liberty. Or do we? Now? Still? The liberal economic order crashed ten years ago with the result, on the one hand, that liberals have lost confidence and, on the other hand, that the enemies of liberty have gained in assertiveness.

The enemies I have in mind are the real and undisguised ones. In China, Xi Jinping has used his first term to tighten all the reins of dictatorship and to give his rule the underpinning of a new ideology of aggressive nationalism, under his slogan of the “China Dream.” In Russia, Vladimir Putin has completed a Kremlin-orchestrated kleptocratic consolidation, steered Russia away from a possible path towards democracy, and given his regime the underpinning of a fascistoid ideology under the slogan of “Eurasianism.”

Both these regimes, that of Xi in China and of Putin in Russia, are openly and unapologetically anti-liberal. Xi boasts of the “China model” that it is superior to democracy in effectiveness and has taken to promoting it to others. Putin speaks the language of enmity – Europe, the European Union, democracy, liberalism are enemies out to get Russia – and has made himself the bully in the international schoolyard. These are regimes in which liberty does not enter into the equation of governance and which are on a mission to outcompete (in China’s case) and destroy (in Russia’s case) the liberal opposition.

Both do that in part by undermining the liberal order in democratic countries. Russia is active in America to disrupt democratic procedures and stimulate social unrest and antagonism. European populism, wherever it rears its head, gets Russian encouragement. China uses its economic and ideological power to coerce businesses, universities, media, civil society groups and governments in Oceania, Asia, Europe and America to kowtow to its eminence and stay silent on anything critical of oppressive practices.

Both also operate in disregard of international law and norms of decency. Russia’s modus is denial – of any responsibility for the use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs in Syria, of any responsibility for the shooting down of a civilian flight over Ukraine, at the cost of 298 lives, of any responsibility for political assassination (attempts) with illegal chemical weapons on British soil. China is building artificial islands in other countries’ waters in the South China Sea, and putting military bases on them, in contravention of international law and a ruling in the Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, and of previous commitments.

These regimes are now successful both domestically and internationally. At home, they do have opposition and therefore never relax oppression, but by and large their populations are accommodating to the fact of autocracy. In both cases, nationalistic ideology is deployed to do its usual magic of disguising oppression. Abroad, they are up against, if that is the word, Trump, Brexit and a European Union in crisis, which is to say next to no liberal leadership. Democracy itself is going illiberal, with the leader of the free world delighting in the company of dictators and on undermining established allies.

And we liberals individually? Do we still believe in liberty? Is liberty still the defining core of our value system? Are we still geared to defending it? Do we recognise that liberty is under attack and is eroding? Where is the liberal voice up against assertive and aggressive authoritarianism?

The world is in commotion. Where are the liberals?