PARTICIPATION IV: “THE PARTICIPATION STATE”

“Participatory democracy” is a bit of a misnomer. Democracy is by definition participatory: citizens vote and engage in the making of public opinion into a political force. On this level, the role of citizens is to make demands on the governance that is in the hands of representatives and officials.

But there is now a view that this is not enough of a role for citizens if democracy is to be vibrant and responsive. There is a demand not just for different policies but for a different way of doing politics.

A first response is to improve the channels for citizens to provide political input. Much can be done here, for example with techniques such as deliberative opinion polling. That is important, but still limited: citizens are allowed opinions, but the doing is by “those up there.” Can citizens participate directly in the doing?

They already are. People do voluntary work in the provision of services and make financial contributions to charities that do good works. Governments support this with tax exemptions for charitable givings. This is a form of participatory provision of public goods. More could be done by building on this experience.

Here is a proposal: Governments step up their contributions from tax exemptions to obliging themselves to match the contributions of citizen. Whatever citizens provide, either in money or labour, would generate an equivalent provision from the government. That would be a huge stimulus to citizens to engage in good works.

It would also represent a shift in decision-making. The deciding on what to do would be in the hands of citizens. They would have contributory support from the government but the doing would be theirs. We would then have a model in which citizens are in charge of deciding and doing, with the government in the more limited role of facilitator.

Say, as an example, a group of parents think the local school should offer pupils more physical education. They raise half the money to employ a teacher for the purpose, knowing that the government is obliged to match their contribution. The parents have decided what service should be offered and are able to get it done.

You might argue that it is the government’s responsibility to provide services. Well and good, but if you insist that all the doing must be the responsibility of the government, you are also saying that your own role can be no more than to put pressure on the government. If the starting point of this argument is that the participation available to citizens is too limited, why not welcome the opportunity to take charge directly in the deciding on what should be done? Why not welcome a participation that comes with both power and responsibility?

In the example given, there is a lot in it for citizens, in this case the group of parents. They get a teacher job established by raising only half of the money needed. For every £1 they provide, £2 go to the school. They get to decide what teacher job should be established – they have the power. They get involvement with the local school. They get an opportunity to shift a bit of their family spending from yet more consumption trinkets to socially useful doings under their own control.

There is also much in it for the government. As a result of its facilitation, it sees a useful service being provided. It has let citizens decide which service and helps realise something citizens want. It is cheap for the public purse. Not only have citizens raised half the money needed, much of the additional money the government puts in, it gets back. The money goes into a salary on which the school pays social insurance contributions and the new teacher pays income taxes. The teacher spends the remaining income, generating VAT revenue back to the public purse. That spending in the next round stimulates further economic activity, which generates further public revenue.

Step up a notch and imagine thousands and thousands of such initiatives throughout the land. You then have a democratic structure of social justice: doings are in response to needs identified by citizens and under their authority. Citizens massively decide on the provision of public goods, in a decentralised pattern. Ordinary people here, there and everywhere make decisions. They take power and accept responsibility. The government facilitates and supports their doing. Much of that doing will be in the form of job creation. You therefore have a structure that creates jobs, and by and large good jobs. And an efficient structure free from stifling bureaucracy.

In the aggregate, there is again much in it for the government as well. It offers a way out of the blight of public poverty within private wealth. Things get done which the government itself could not do. When the government is the doer, all doing needs to be funded from taxes. But the raising of new taxes for additional doings is now very difficult. By and large, tax revenues are committed to existing doings, and by and large tax extraction has reached its limit within the constraints of global capitalism. Cynically, the arrangement I am suggesting is a way to get people to pay voluntarily what they would not be willing to pay in taxes.

I have had in mind a country like Britain, which is relatively poor in the provision of public goods and in which tax extraction has (pretty much) reached its social limit, but which is rich in what might broadly be called public provision institutions. That includes, for example, institutions like the National Trust or English Heritage and many similar ones, many local, schools and universities, and a vast network of charities. These are institutions rearing to do more work in their respective fields. Along with a strong tradition of voluntary and charitable participation, they represent an underused national capital. With more stimulus, it would be meaningful for citizens to get together and create their own institutions, small or larger, to work for causes of their interest.

Obviously, there would have to be a regulatory regime for which private provisions would trigger an equivalent government provision and which institutions are eligible partners. Obviously, there would have to be oversight to avoid exploitation and corruption. Not easy, the devil is in the detail, but doable.

My argument is that with strong government encouragement in the form of a 100% matching commitment, a second level of public provision, grounded in citizenship participation, would be possible. On the first level, citizens pay taxes and the government provides services. This, roughly, is the “welfare state.” On the second level, citizens take in hand service provision and are able to do that thanks to government facilitation. This we might call the “participation state.”

 

WHO CALLED BRITAIN’S SNAP ELECTION?

There will be Parliamentary elections on the 8th of June. Parliament was scheduled to sit until the next ordinary election in 2020 but the Prime Minister, Theresa May, decided to call a snap election while reflecting on the matter during some days of walking in the Welsh hills with her husband.

Only it was not the Prime Minister’s decision, but Parliament’s. Technically, the Prime Minister recommended to Parliament to call an election and Parliament so did, the House of Commons the very next day.

This provision came in with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 which removed the power to call snap elections from the Prime Minister. The intention of this Act is that Parliaments will sit five years, that everyone will know when the next election will be, and that Prime Ministers should not have the unfair advantage of being able to call an election whenever it suits his or her side. However, the Act also empowered Parliament to trigger an election before the end of the five years term, if there are exceptional circumstances and by a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons.

But although the snap election was technically called by Parliament, in reality it was the Prime Minister’s decision. It turned out that the Act had not practically moved that power to Parliament.

The 2017 election is unnecessary and has been triggered for obvious party-political and tactical reasons. It is exactly the kind of surprise election the 2011 Act was supposed to prevent. Why did Parliament go along with it? Even the opposition on its own had enough votes to deny the Prime Minister.

One answer is that the opposition caved in because it would otherwise look cowardly. That may be so but is not a sufficient explanation. The 2011 Act puts a duty on Parliament to consider if there are extraordinary circumstances to warrant an early election. The House of Commons, rubber-stamping the Prime Minister’s decision without delay, can hardly be said to have examined the circumstances carefully. It was simply ambushed. Remember that the House is not in control of its own agenda. It was for the government to decide that the House would deal with the issue the next day.

This is what should have happened: The Prime Minister recommends to Parliament that it triggers an early election. The House of Commons puts the matter to its relevant select committee for deliberation. That would, firstly, give the House a bit of time to collect itself and would enable debate on the matter in the press and in the country, at least a few days of time. Then, secondly, the committee would prepare a report on the proposal, putting it into its constitutional context and going over arguments for and against. The committee might make a recommendation to the House, or possibly majority and minority recommendations. Only then, and with the aid of careful deliberation in committee, would the House deal with the matter in plenum. The House would have escaped the ambush and it would be legitimate to turn the Prime Minister down if the deliberation had not turned up persuasive arguments for an extraordinary election. It might even be that the Prime Minister would not have called the snap election out of fear of being thwarted by Parliament.

Parliament might still have decided to grant the Prime Minister her wish, but it would not have been a foregone conclusion. And it is certain that without an institutionalised procedure of deliberation, Parliament could not have decided otherwise than it did.

Some general themes:

  1. It is not enough to technically empower Parliament in a certain matter. Parliament must follow up by instituting proper procedures to exercise its power with effect. Such procedures must be binding on Parliament itself so that they cannot be manipulated. The House of Commons should take control of its own agenda.
  2. The House of Commons does excellent work when given proper work to do. But in decision-making, it does not have adequate procedures and does not do the work it should.
  3. As things stand, Britain does not have a safe system of political decision-making.

ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIPS

In America and Britain, the world’s core democracies, the legislatures, Congress and Parliament, are the weak link in the system of governance and in danger of marginalising themselves towards irrelevance.

We the people elect lawmakers to make important decisions on our behalf. An executive is constituted to collaborate with the legislature in the preparation of policies and to put into effect the lawmakers’ decisions. Among several reasons for this double structure of governance is that it increases the likelihood that decisions are well prepared and that governance will be effective. That’s part of the case for democracy.

Dictatorships do not have a similar double structure. There the making of law and the implementation of law is in the same hands. That increases the risk not only of despotic policies, but also of badly prepared decisions slipping through because there is not enough scrutiny in the process.

A problem with the democratic double structure is that there tends to be a tug of war between the legislature and the executive about who should do what. The executive invariably wants to dominate. If that is allowed to happen, the benefit of double structure scrutiny may go lost and democracy pervert towards de facto dictatorship. It falls on the legislature to stand up to the executive’s inclination to dictate.

In Britain, the tug of war has become visible in the preparation for Brexit. The government initially insisted that it should be in charge (by “royal prerogative”) with little or no involvement of Parliament until the government had negotiated a new deal with the European Union. However, that attempt by the government to claim for itself powers that belong to Parliament, failed when the Supreme Court ruled that the government did not have the authority to trigger Brexit without a formal decision by Parliament.

However, the remarkable thing in this process was that Parliament itself was unable to stand up to the government’s assault. We had the undignified spectacle of individual MPs appearing on the evening news and demanding that the government involved Parliament, while Parliament itself had no voice in the matter. Only when a private citizen brought the matter before the courts, could they lay down the government’s duty to collaborate with Parliament.

The government responded with issuing a Brexit Bill, as it then had to, but continued the battle for dominance. The Bill is only 130 words long, with no detail, and Parliament was given only five days to deal with it. Again, the spectacle of individual MPs popping up to complain and demanding that the government gives them more time. But Parliament itself has no voice in deciding on its own procedure.

In America, Donald Trump was inaugurated into the presidency and set about issuing a flurry of “executive orders” with wide reaching consequences. In so doing, he was claiming for himself the authority (the American version of “prerogative”) to make new law without involving Congress. This turned into a case study in the risks inherent in decision making without scrutiny. One sweeping order suspended entry into the country of all refugees for 120 days, of Syrian refugees indefinitely, and of all citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries for 90 days. This was a manifestly bad decision, with unforeseen consequences galore and bringing global condemnation down upon America, a result of the decision having been badly prepared or not prepared at all. It was also a despotic decision, setting aside established American law in the matters concerned.

The order on refugees was brought before the courts by civic groups and immediately set aside as unlawful, at least in part. The remarkable thing, however, as with Parliament in Britain, was that Congress itself had nothing to say about the executive’s usurpation of legislative power. Some members of Congress grumbled but Congress itself said nothing.

At the time of writing, the outcome of these tugs of war is unknown. Meanwhile, the respective governments come under criticism for being power hungry and ruling autocratically. That criticism is valid, but superficial. The executive will, if it can, grab power. It is for the legislature to prevent it. In both America and Britain, the weak link in the system of governance is a legislature, Congress and Parliament respectively, that does not assert itself and fails to do its constitutional job. It is when the legislature fails that democracy can pervert towards elective dictatorship.

BREXIT – FLAWED PROCESS MEANS FLAWED RESULT

Britain does not have a safe system of political decision-making. Important decisions are made unilaterally by the government, the prime minister really, with Parliament having next to no role, except to finally ratify the government’s decisions. Prime ministerial whims prevail.

It is a law of public policy that good decisions depend on good process. If the process is flawed, the outcome is likely to be flawed. If you want good decisions, take care of the process.

The reason the British system is unsafe is that governmental decisions are not adequately deliberated on, scrutinised and tested. That’s why public policies are a parade of blunders, small and large.

In preparing for Brexit, the prime minister’s whim is to protect the prime ministerial system of government. This is the system once famously branded an “elective dictatorship” (by Lord Hailsham, in 1976). It is the system that allowed Britain to stumble into the invasion of Iraq on the then prime minister’s whim. In this system alternative views to that of the government count for nothing. Public policies are the government’s dictate rather than the outcome of national compromise.

In her Brexit speech yesterday, the prime minister made clear that decision-making is to be in the government’s hand and that Parliament’s role will be to ratify the outcome. This is an unsafe process towards a likely flawed result.

The process has already caused visible damage. Brexit is being made infinitely more confrontational than needs be. The divisions at home from the referendum campaign are not being healed. The views of the 48 percent count for nothing. Britain is causing a monumental fall-out between the democratic countries of Europe in an acrimonious divorce. Once Brexit was a fact, a coming together at home would have been possible, as would a rational collaboration between European friends towards an amicable settlement. But the process the prime minister is clinging on to is leading us to conflict on both fronts.

It is not too late to improve on the process. But it depends on Parliament not accepting yet again to be side-lined. It is for Parliament to temper the prime minister’s whim. It is not good enough for MPs to sit around on their backsides, sulk, and beg to be consulted. Parliament needs to assert itself.