WHY DEMOCRACY X: PEACE

Democratic countries do not fight wars against each other. This is true today, was true in all of the twentieth century, and was true in the nineteenth century in that countries with then democratic institutions and with a substantial part of the male population enfranchised, did not fight wars with each other. Hence, a more democratic world would promise to be also a more peaceful world.

The observation that countries in which governments are under some form of popular check are less likely to be warring, was first made by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in a publication of 1795 entitled Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden). Here he not only proposed the equivalent of a UN Charter in which countries commit themselves to peaceful coexistence. He also recommended that countries should adopt republican constitutions since that would make them less prone to war.

The peaceful inclination in democratic governments is due partly to the distribution of power in the population. Since the glories of war accrue mainly to élites and the costs of war fall disproportionately on the populace, élites may incline to war where they are not answerable to the populace and be more constrained from war where they are under popular control. Other reasons may be a high level of trade between democratic countries, that democratic leaders and citizens learn the art of compromise, that they see people in other democratic countries as similar to themselves, and that their communality encourages a habit of peaceful negotiations and treaties.

Regrettably, democratic countries have not in the same way been able or willing to avoid war with non-democratic countries. They have fought wars of more or less defence against non-democratic aggressors, as in the Second World War, and then with uninhibited brutality. And they have fought wars of aggression in self-interest, as for example the many and violent colonial wars that for example Britain and France engaged in during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Democracy, then, is good for peace in the world – but does not guarantee peace.

WHY DEMOCRACY VIII: PROSPERITY

In today’s world, democracies are prosperous countries and prosperous countries are democracies. The established democratic countries of North America, Western Europe and Oceania are also the most democratic countries. In Europe, recent democratisation has been followed by increasing prosperity in Spain, Portugal, Greece and the countries of Central Europe. In Latin America, the democratic exceptions (until recently) of Costa Rica and Uruguay are also the region’s most prosperous countries. In Africa, Botswana is the most successful country both democratically and economically. In East Asia, it is the democratic countries of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan that have risen to the level of high-income countries.

The significant exception is India. Although economic growth is now very strong, India remains a democracy with widespread and oppressive poverty. It is a country that should have done better in prosperity. But within India, the rule still applies. Kerala is the leading state in both democracy and prosperity.

China is sometimes thought of as the great economic success story of our time. But except for the bigness of the economy, and its therefore clout in the world, China’s economic performance falls short of the standard in the region set by neighbouring Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Are democratic countries prosperous because of democracy? We cannot say for certain, it could be the other way around. But there are good reasons to think that democracy is conducive to prosperity. In some cases, the sequence is in favour of this hypothesis. The new democracies in Europe have grown to prosperity after they became democracies. South Korea and Taiwan took off in development under autocratic regimes but went on to grow economically to the level of high-income after having transformed politically to democracy.

Some of the reasons we should expect democracy to encourage prosperity are the following: Citizens are more likely to feel secure under regimes of protection and predictability and therefore more confident in enterprise. They have free access to information and deliberation and are therefore better positioned to entrepreneurship. They are more likely to have the protection of safety nets to fall back on and therefore more able to take on economic risk. There is rule of law, including property and contract law, and therefore more security in enterprise and occupation and less susceptibility to corruption and gangster rule. Governance is more likely to be effective and therefore more likely to deliver infrastructural and other forms of support. Democratic polities co-exist with market economies and market economies have proved to be more efficient than command or monopolistic economies.

Autocracy with prosperity is not inconceivable. The Chinese party-state defends autocracy with the claim that it is delivering prosperity for the population. There has been impressive economic growth in recent decades. However, what has been delivered so far is elevation to a level of middle-income. The promise of prosperity depends on China escaping the middle-income trap, which is yet to be seen. Furthermore, the party-state promises people prosperity on the condition that they surrender their freedom. Only democracy holds up the audacious promise of both prosperity and freedom.

CAMPAIGN FOR DEMOCRACY: AN APPEAL TO PRESIDENTS BUSH AND OBAMA

Look carefully. Something is happening in American politics. For the good. Democracy itself is striking back against the onslaught of anti-politics.

In Washington, Congress is doing its job and holding the zeal of an erratic president in check. Out in the country, states and cities are running policies of their own, on health care, climate change, gerrymandering, campaign finance and more.

We are seeing the volatility of the politics of anger. Anger is still involvement. Democracy would be worse off if the grass-roots were in apathy. Involvement can be turned from revenge to engagement.

In unrelated events but on the same day, October 19, George W. Bush and Barack Obama both stepped on to the political stage and spoke in defense of the values and principles of democracy.

Mr. Bush’s message, at a conference he himself convened, was stark. He spoke of fading confidence, a society torn apart by hatreds, the absence of common purpose, challenges to our most basic ideals, and the need to “recover our own identity.” Mr. Obama, for his part, had offered the same analysis in his final State of the Union Address, in January 2016. He called on his fellow Americans that “we fix our politics” to prevent “democracy from grinding to a halt.” A better politics, he said, “doesn’t mean we have to agree on everything, but it does require basic bonds of trust between its citizens. Democracy breaks down when the average person feels their voice doesn’t matter. Too many Americans feel that way right now.”

Much is at stake. Radical populism is sweeping America and Europe. The core democracies, the United States and the United Kingdom, are in crises of identity, following through to dysfunctional governance. Societies are torn asunder by extremes of inequality and animosity. Internationally, the People’s Republic of China is claiming the mantel of world leadership.

Leaders of authority in America and Europe are seeking to stimulate engagement from below to revitalize democracy. The George W. Bush Institute is launching a “call to action” to affirm democratic values and restore trust in democratic institutions. The recent Obama Foundation “summit” was a celebration of civic engagement trough examples of good practice. In Germany, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier is orchestrating a nation-wide deliberation for better understanding of the imperative of democracy. The concern is the same as expressed by Bush and Obama, to fortify the foundations of democratic culture.

The day Bush and Obama spoke for liberal democracy in America was also the second day of the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. Here, the leader Xi Jinping, who in his first five years has tightened all the screws of dictatorship, was celebrating, with audacious self-confidence, the superiority of autocracy over democracy.

In a comment (in the Süddeutsche Zeitung), the German author Kai Strittmatter called on the liberal democracies to “find their voice” up against the challenges of a threatening new world order under a totalitarian power state. Chinese autocracy promises prosperity on the condition that citizens give up their liberty. Liberal democracy promises both prosperity and liberty. Democracy has the moral high ground. But during his recent trip to Asia, the American president, the leader of the free world, had nothing to say about even basic human rights. The voice of democracy is not heard.

The politics of anger can go both ways, to more revenge or to more engagement. It is not unusual these days to find opinions in the press that democracy has had its day and is finished. But experienced leaders like Bush, Obama and Steinmeier are telling us that there is engagement out there waiting to be mobilized.

The time is right to turn from despondency to action. That requires a catalyst to tilt the balance. Democracy is ready to strike back, but that will not just happen, it must be taken in hand. As always, the democratic world needs American leadership. If America can “recover its identity” it can help the rest of us to “find our voice.”

Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama have committed themselves. Let us ask these two most recently retired Presidents, who, from each side of the political divide, see the same problem and understand the urgency of action in the same way, to join forces. Let us ask them to teach us that our divisions are not irreconcilable. Let us offer to join them with our engagement. Let us ask them to make themselves the catalyst of the democratic revival that is ready to happen. Let us ask them to merge their formidable authority to mobilizing groups and communities into a Campaign for Democracy. Let us ask the Campaign for Democracy to spread through the democratic world.

THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA

First published in ChinaFile.

Democracies have found it difficult to deal with the great dictatorships. So now with China. The first difficulty is to recognise just what we are up against, and to avoid wishful thinking.

  1. Totalitarianism

In his first five years, Xi Jinping has reshaped the Chinese state so radically that he has taken the People’s Republic into the third phase in its historic march, after the ideological madness of Mao and the economic pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping and his followers. He inherited a state intent on economic advancement, and has turned it into one intent on political control.

His reign has imposed a relentless concentration of power, in the country to Beijing, in Beijing to the Party and in the Party to the leader. When he speaks, his message is invariably Party discipline. There has been a step-by-step tightening of repression against human rights lawyers and political and religious activists. Ethnic minorities suffer under cultural persecution. Censorship is harder. Political education, mass campaigns and thought-work are back with a vengeance, as is ideology in Xi’s narrative of national greatness in his “China Dream.”

The regime is equally determined in propaganda. There is much of old-fashioned boasting, but the real work is done more subtly. School children are taught to love the Party but the more effective influence is through careful editing of teaching material in history and other subjects to promote the national truth. Contrary to expectations, the internet has not become a lever for opening up from below but another instrument of control from above. Two million “internet opinion analysts” are on the job not only of keeping undesirable material out but also shaping what goes in, which is done so that even much of the criticism that circulates on the web, appearing to be from private citizens, is of the right kind.

The concentration of power and the tightening of dictatorial controls are logical. The party-state needs legitimacy. Since Deng’s reform and opening up, it has relied extensively on economic growth and the spreading of rewards in the population. Now, with expectations inflated and growth slipping, the regime can rely less on its ability to purchase the people’s gratitude. The leaders know the danger. Always weary of their grip on power, they turn, pre-emptively, to tighter controls and nationalistic ideology. Revolution has no traction in a kleptocracy in which officials enrich themselves by looting the state and income inequality is more extreme than in most capitalist countries. The available narrative is that of national glory.

The modern Chinese state does not rely on being forbidding to its people in their daily lives. Indeed, ordinary Chinese now have many freedoms that no one interferes with. But it has its red lines and does forbid what cannot be accepted: interference in Party affairs and organizing outside of the Party apparatus. Even in social media, where individuals on their own can mostly operate undisturbed, organized networking elicits sanction.

The regime has reverted to the Maoist ambition of shaping people’s mindsets. It censors information and dispenses propaganda with deadly seriousness. Schools train unquestioning fact-absorbing minds. The anti-corruption campaign is used to make people believe the party-state is being cleaned up. (A remarkable propagandistic skill of the regime is to have itself given credit for freeing people from the miseries it has itself imposed on them.) As other exposed leaders, they turn to nationalism and co-opt good people into a nasty venture of “national rejuvenation.”

Is it succeeding in not only controlling people’s behavior but also their minds? Chinese people are not more gullible or less capable of cynicism than others but are more than others subjected to aggressive thought-work. Propaganda and ideology are powerful tools, often dismissed by observers as tittle-tattle but never ignored by the leaders themselves. The perfect dictatorship aims not only to hold people in line but to make them believe that repressive order is for their own good. The Party is not without opposition and has heroic activists working against it. Lawyers continue to hold the authorities and courts to their own laws. Ethnic minorities are in latent revolt. Religious revival is sweeping the country. The leaders do not for a moment trust the people and never relax necessary controls.

But while the dictatorship is tightening, it is also increasingly able to rely on people’s self-control and make itself so smooth that it in some ways does not even look dictatorial. Activists are more likely to be seen by non-activists as a nuisance than as role models. As strange as it may sound in a population of 1.3 billion people, the Party hears everything, sees everything and knows everything. In his trial in 2014, the activist Yang Maodong defied the court with an eloquent defense statement in which he compared today’s China “blow by blow” to the nightmare state of George Orwell’s 1984.

If the dictators may be making the people believers, after a fashion, could it be that they are persuading themselves likewise? Possibly. The top brass live elevated lives in their Zhongnonhai enclosed compound, far removed from ordinary people’s daily grind, with their own protected food supply and behind the safety of air filtering systems. Xi Jinping looks and behaves like a man who really believes in the reds aristocracy’s right and duty to rule. The state may be a kleptocracy, but it is not more farfetched that those who float to the top there see themselves as righteous than that, for example, European nineteenth century aristocrats, who sat on societies rotten with corruption and vice, saw themselves as the custodians of orders of virtue. If the mission is now national greatness, is then not the Party again the instrument of a noble cause? If they are cleaning up the corruption, are they not reviving classical values of austerity and honesty? People who tell stories, and repeat them and have them repeated, are exposed to believing what they say and hear.

A prudent leader would rest on his laurels and use his powers for other purposes, such as to reform the economy. But Xi has brewed for himself a dangerous cocktail of personal power, ideology and propaganda. The imperative is to secure the perpetuation of Party rule. Xi sees himself as the man who can impose the necessary discipline within the Party and controls throughout society to avoid Soviet-style disintegration. He is a man with a mission, a believer in his mission, surrounded by other believers, and with a population, at least in his own eyes, of believers. When has any leader, dizzy with power and success, able to bend history, experiencing love and adulation, been able to say to himself: enough?

The economic miracle is over and China is getting stuck in the middle-income trap. The socialist market economy’s many contradictions can no longer be smoothed over by having money from mega-growth thrown at them. Such contentment as there may be in the population is not to be trusted. There is nowhere for this regime to go other than to controls justified by mythology. The leader who has reaped success for his efforts, will continue. He is in control, but control is not yet infallible. He has said to his people that “each person’s future and destiny is linked with the future and destiny of the country and nation” (in his launch of the China Dream), but his teachings are not yet fully absorbed.

So it is for the great dictators. They work day and night but utopia is denied them and their job is never done.

  1. Imperialism

When China and Norway normalized relations earlier this year, they issued a joint declaration in which the big power took the opportunity to humiliate the little one. (Official China-Norway relations had been frozen for six years after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the late human rights activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010.) The Norwegian government declares its respect for various standard PRC interests and achievements, including (from one of the world’s most advanced welfare states) its social system. No similar respect for Norwegian values or achievements is expressed from the Chinese side.

Why was the Chinese government so haughty? The answer is that it did what it must do, considering the kind of state it is.

The People’s Republic is a superpower with Chinese characteristics. Its vision is “rejuvenation” for national greatness. China is to re-establish itself as the “middle kingdom,” elevated in dignity above lesser powers. Hence the emissaries of a small nation, as in imperial times, must pay tribute when they come to Beijing seeking favor.

The best interpretation of Chinese foreign policy is to see it through the prism of a great power seeking domination in the world. It may not be exporting its model, it may not be a warring state, but it aims to dominate. Deng Xiaoping, who brought China back to economic sanity after Mao, advised the country then to “hide your strength and bide your time.” The time has now come.

The project of domination is most visible in China’s dealing with its neighbors in East Asia. In the South China Sea, China has undertaken one of the biggest territorial grabs ever in history, effectively confiscating vast territories that by international law are either international waters or belong to other countries, notably the Philippines and Vietnam. These territories are being colonized by the building of artificial islands, some with military bases. The area China claims makes up 3 million of the South China Sea’s 3.5 million square kilometers. This grab is not something China might do, it is what it has done.

The reason China has taken control in the South China Sea, is that it has the power to do so. It has also felt its way into the East China Sea, bolstering its clam to the Senkaku (in Japanese) or Diaoyu (in Chinese) Islands. But here it is up against Japan, whose navy is more than a match for its own and has shown itself willing to respond, and is therefore maneuvering with more restraint. It has established an “air defense zone” in which it claims the right to control air traffic, but that is so far what its power has allowed it to do.

Beijing claims Taiwan to be part of its territory and is succeeding in getting that version of history accepted by bullying anyone who wants to be on good terms into signing up to their version of the “One-China Policy,” although Taiwan has never been ruled as a part of China, except for the short period from 1945 to 1949. On North Korea, it is pretending to be a force of restraint while in fact upholding the mutual Treaty of Friendship and assisting the North Korean regime economically, including by, at best, selective implementation of international sanctions. Beijing’s interest here is to maintain a divided Korea and to avoid any North Korean “instability” that might disturb its own rise.

Beyond its near neighborhood, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Xi Jinping’s brainchild, is an audacious program of infrastructural investments to create a system of trade and communication links through Asia and into the broader world, including, for example, a modern railway network now being built in East Africa with Chinese credit and technology.

These investments will bring economic activity and growth to recipient countries and regions, and in the bargain return multiple benefits to China. The links reach out from Beijing like spikes in a wheel, with China literally the middle kingdom in a structure spanning much of the globe. The capital is provided as credit, turning recipient nations into Chinese debtors on a grand scale.

Here, the People’s Republic is procuring that most precious of power resources which has so far eluded it: international friendships. The OBOR investments are real, as are the economic rewards that flow from them. Countries and national élites on the receiving end throw their lot in with China because China has given them good reasons to do so. American imperialism has rested in part on soft power alliances. Now Beijing is outdoing the master and building alliances of its own with investment power.

In the democratic world, China is up against powers greater than itself and cannot dominate as it does dependents. But it can make its importance felt. This it does in part with threats. Any government that receives the Dalai Lama, or speaks up for human or minority rights, or with any indication of support for Taiwanese independence or in remembrance of Tiananmen 1989, is in danger of retaliation – and almost none do. Here too, China works through investment power: into property, into Hollywood’s influence industry, into universities with Confucius Institutes. Its propaganda machine is international, some of it operating openly and some through news agencies that work for Beijing’s design under a camouflage of independence. Where weakened democracies, now America, leave a vacuum, China steps in. It is winning over apologists and fellow travelers in politics, business and academia, and is gaining quiet influence day by day.

  1. The mechanisms of domination

A state that is totalitarian at home and imperialistic abroad should be a pariah in the world. There are various reasons why China is not.

  • Size, power and the clever exercise of power. It is just not possible for others, at least on their own, to deal with this big and determined superpower differently from how it wants to be seen. The Philippines have had their sea territory stolen but have, after an unsuccessful attempt to resist through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, opted for friendship with the perpetrator.
  • China is good for business. Best to be on good terms. In Henry Paulson’s eulogy for China business, Dealing With China, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 gets only the lightest of mention.
  • Those who cross the regime are in danger of revenge, such as exclusion from operations in China. Environmental NGOs like Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature and Conservation International are silent on China’s environmental destructions in the South China Sea.
  • Self-censorship. Even in the critical academic literature, the Chinese dictatorship is almost never more than “authoritarian.”
  • China-fascination, of the uncritical kind. In Henry Kissinger’s On China, China is a “civilization state,” now no less than previously.

CHINA AND THE EMBARRASSMENT OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY

It is an uncomfortable truth, as we leave 2016, the year of reaction, that democracy is in trouble. But the trouble for democracy does not come from Beijing, or from globalisation, or from abroad, or, in Britain, from Europe. It resides at home. The trouble for democracy, at this time in history, comes from our own poor ability to reform.

The Chinese regime has had a good 2016 because it was a bad year for democracy. Official Chinese media and various commentators have made fun of the Brexit referendum in Britain and the Trump victory in the United States as being what you get if you are careless enough to let the people decide. The Chinese system is being held up as a model of stability. The leader, Xi Jinping, has exploited uncertainty and vacuum in the West, first at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Peru in November 2016 and then at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, to brazenly offer China up to the world as the guarantor of economic openness and free trade.

The awkward thing for the democracy side is that the Chinese dictators have been given a godsend of democratic weakness, so much so that Western democracy is widely seen to be in “crisis.” Both the Brexit vote and Trump’s victory were perverse. In Britain, there is a majority in the population and in Parliament in favour of continued membership in the European Union, but because of low voter participation among the young, that majority did not prevail in the referendum. In America, the losing candidate won the majority of the popular vote. In both countries, ugly campaigns embraced and encouraged sundry voices of xenophobia, fear of the other, racism and divisiveness which we until the fateful year of 2016 had thought had been marginalised to the dark and dusty corners of the house of modernity.

The turmoils of democracy in the West represent a shift in the balance of soft power in the world. Europe and America, in confusion and uncertainty, today look unimpressive. It is easy for Beijing to present the Chinese model as safe, stable and predictable. It is this shift in the power of esteem that Xi Jinping has been able to play on, successfully, in his travels to the West.

But there is more to Beijing’s interpretation of the misfortunes of democracy. The Chinese leaders have perfected a model which has proved itself functional for the perpetuation of their own regime. It is for that purpose above all that they are determined to retain dictatorial control and not risk democratic reforms. However, there is also a view, both among regime insiders and some commentators, such as the political scientist Daniel A. Bell in his The China Model, that the Chinese political system is genuinely superior to any democratic system, both in delivering effective governance and also morally.

We cannot know if the Chinese leaders really believe that their model is superior, or if their claim to superiority is only window dressing for the maintenance of the dictatorship they depend on. But if there is a temptation on their part to believe their own propaganda, that temptation will now have been stimulated. In my own analysis of the Chinese system, in my book The Perfect Dictatorship, I see the Chinese regime as a dangerous one in the world, or at least potentially dangerous. Its propensity to aggression is most visible in the South China Sea. The Chinese state is powerful. What may make it dangerous is a conviction in the minds of the leaders in Beijing that they are the custodians of a unique virtue. That conviction they are themselves cultivating with the revival of ideology in the form of the nationalistic and chauvinistic rhetoric of “the China Dream.” It has now been given the additional stimulus that their model has suddenly come to look better compared to the alternative. When democracy performs poorly, it is logical that those who have advocated autocracy feel that history is proving them right. It is logical that the leaders of a powerful state, who believe to be seeing that history is on their side, will make their state a more assertive one vis-à-vis neighbours and others.

There is a competition in the world between Western democracy and Chinese-style autocracy. For the West to stand tall in that competition, democratic governments must see to it that their democratic systems perform, deliver and command respect. The way to do that is through constant reform. Democracies are imperfect. They are strong not by being perfect – only dictatorships can be perfect – but by imperfections being recognised and worked on.

The systems the Chinese leaders and others are now able to make fun of, have neglected the imperative of constant reform. In America, the main problem is that the power of money has been allowed to prevail so that ordinary citizens rightly feel that the system is rigged in favour of the rich and that they themselves have no say. In Britain, the main problem is an excessively centralised system of political power with a wide gulf of distance between the rulers in London and the people throughout the land. In both countries, income and wealth has been redistributed to the rich and ultra-rich, leaving the middle class, not to mention the poor, behind in neglect and humiliation. The foundations of the democratic architecture has been allowed to crumble.

(First published in openDemocracy)

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY AFTER 2016 – YEAR OF REACTION

Brexit. Trump. In Britain, the country’s membership in the European Union is rejected in a referendum. In America, a maverick anti-establishment political outsider wins the presidency. These results are monumental political upheavals in the two countries, with consequences that reach beyond their shores and throughout the world.

Britain and America are the world’s core democracies. These countries have been bearers of a political-economic venture that has come to define the meaning of modern democracy. In 2016, to the surprise of winners and losers alike, the idea that the future is liberal and that history is moving in that direction, has suffered a defeat from which it may not soon recover. What was lost in these tests was finally a set of ideas.

Read the article in the Cairo Review.